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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KARL R. LYMAN and EDITH K.
LYMAN, his wife,
Plaintiffs arnd Respondents,
-vs.NATIONAL MORTGAGE BOND
CORPORATION, a corporation of
the State of Delaware; SAN JUAN
COUNTY, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah, and all
other persons unknown claiming
right, title, estate or interest in or
lien upon the real property described in the complaint adverse to
plaintiffs' ownership or clouding
plaintiffs' title thereto,
Defendants,
AMALIA V. YBARRA, personally;
AMALIA V. YBARRA as administratrix of the Estate of Thomas V elarde, Deceased,
Defendants and .Appell(]Jn.ts.

Case
No. 8633

PEriTION FOR REHEARING
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Come now the plaintiffs and respondents and respectfully petition the court to grant a rehearing and reconsider the above case on the following grounds :
1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. The court failed to give effect to its prior decisions interpreting the so-called four year tax title statute,
(see H(UJ!l.sen v. Morris, 3 Ut. 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884, and
Peterson/ v. Callister, 6 Ut. 2d 359, 313 P. 2d 814).
2. In determining whether the so-called four year
statute on tax titles was strictly a statute of limitations
and determining the legislative intent in the enactment of
this particular statute, the court erred in disregarding
the preamble of the bill which was enacted by the
Legislature.
3. The court erred in holding that the limitation
statutes only barred the right of the o,riginal owner to
maintain an action where the tax title purchaser establishes a right of possession or ownership in the property.
4. The court erred in stating that plaintiffs had
failed to establish any valid elaim or right to the property
in themselves, and that to hold for the plaintiffs would
leave them in possession although they failed to establish any Yalid claim.
5. The (~ourt erred in failing to determine that there
had been payment of all taxes assessed against the property for at least a four year period.
FRANDSEN .A.ND l{ELLER.
By Duane A. Frandsen,

Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Responden.ts
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts heretofore set forth in respondents' brief is correct and of sufficient detail adequately to present the fact situation. Reference is hereby
made to the statement of facts in that brief.
ARGU1'IENT
PoiNT

I.

THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE EFFECT TO
ITS PRIOR DECISIONS INTERPRETING
THE SO-CALI.1ED FOUR YEAR TAX TITLE
STATUE.
The question of the validity and the effect of the
so-called four year statute of limitation on tax titles has
been before the court on at least two other occasions. It
was first before the court in the case of Han.sen v. Morris,
3 Utah 2nd 310; 283 Pac. 2nd 884, decided on May 12,
1955. In that case the court held that this four year statute on limitations on tax titles was constitutional and in
commenting on the passage of the law which is now Sec.
78-12-5.2, ·ucA 1953, the Court stated:
"Another effort to provide a statute of limitations designed to validate tax titles was made by
passage of Chapter 19, 104-2, Laws of Utah 1951,
78-12-5.2, UCA 1953.... It appears obvious that
such sections were enacted to eliminate the obj ections pointed out in the Toronto case, and were
3
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intended to prevent raising of defenses based on
failure to comply with statutory steps leading
down the long road traversable in perfecting tax
titles, unless one claiming a better title assert his
rights within four years after a document of transfer, valid on its face, has been executed and delivered 'in the course of a statutory proceeding for
the liquidation of any tax levied against*** property whereby the property is relieved from a tax
lien.' ''
The construction of this four year statute of limitations on tax titles and the legislative intent in enacting the statute was again before the court in the case of
Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2nd 359, 313 Pac. 2nd 814.
In that case the court stated:
''Title 78-12-5.1 is a statute of limitations
which prevents the assertion of a defense by a record owner if he has not had possession of the property during a four year period after one has received a tax title thereto . ... It is not unlike other
statutes of limitation, such as those barring an
action on negotable paper by passage of time. The
obligation in such case may remain but the holder
cannot enforce it.... It is a statute of repose, obviously intended to lay at rest claims against tax
titles which are asserted more than four years
after acquisition of a tax title under statutory proceedings, and 'vhere the record owner has not had
possession during that period.
''We believe the legislature had in mind a four
year statute of limitations barring claims against
tax titles, which four year period dated from the
initiation of the tax title, during which period any
claimants against the tax title must have had possession of the property to protect any claim he
4
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might have. Any other interpretation does not
square with the general nature and purpose of the
act, and could lead to novel and, we believe, unintended results, so as to defeat the entire purpose
of a statute that seems to be designed to settle, not
confuse, and to make certain, not uncertain, ti ties
based on statutory liquidation of tax charges.''
(Emphasis added)
/

In these two cases the court has clearly stated that
the present four year statute of limitation was strictly a.
statute of limitation which prevented the asserting of any
defense or claim if the prior owner had been out of possession for more than four years after one had received
tax title thereto. No reference is made to any other requirements, such as the other elements of adverse possession or payment of taxes. To now hold that the other
elements of adverse possession are necessary in order to
establish a title is to completely disregard these other two
former decisions which do not set up any such
requirement.
PoiNT

II.

IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE SOCALLED FOUR YEAR STATUTE ON TAX
TITLES WAS STRICTLY A STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND DETERMINING THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN THE ENACTMENT OF THIS PARTICULAR STATUTE,
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING
THE PREAJ\1BLE OF THE BILL. WHICH
WAS ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE.
The Legislature in 1951 when it enacted the four
year statute of limitations on tax titles declared its inten-
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tion in the preamble of the act. This preamble makes no
mention of other elements of adverse possession or other
elements of ownership being necessary along with the
running of the four year period of time in order for tax
title holder to assert title under the particular act. The
preamble to this act is set forth in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Worthen and is as follows:
''An Act Amending Sections 104-2-5, DCA
1943 as Amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah
1943; 104-2-7 Utah Code Annotated 1943 and 1042-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and Repealing
Section 104-2-5.10, as Amended by Chapter 19,
Laws of Utah 1943 as Amended by Chapter 8,
La"T~vs of Utah 1947, and Enacting New Laws to be
l{nown as Sections 104-2-5.10 and 104-2-5.11,
Limiting the peri-od within which actions may be
commenced for recovery of real prop-erty sold and
conveyed to the County under tax deed or for the
possession thereof." (Emphasis added)
How can there be any other construction placed on
the preamble of this Act than that it "'\Yas intended strictly
as a statute of limitations~? The legislature had already
enacted laws which required the other elements of adverse possession, including possession for a period of
seven years, in order for one holding under a tax deed
where there "'\Vas some defect in the proceeding to assert
a valid title. vVith that la"T already enacted, the Legislature added these t\vo additional sections \Yhich I haYe
referred to herein as statutes of limitation. Had the Legislature intended that the four year statute of limitations
should be effective only after other elements of adverse
possession "'"ere present, it '""ould haYt") amended the prior

6
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law and made a proviso for a four year period where
others claim under tax title rather than a seven year
period which had theretofore prevailed. Instead of doing
this the Legislature enacted new acts and entitled them
Statute of Limitations.
PorNT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE LIMITATION STATUES ONLY BARRED
THE RIGHT OF THE ORIGINAL OWNER TO
M.AINTAIN AN ACTION WHERE THE TAX
TITLE PURCHASER ESTABLISHES A
RIGHT OF POSSESSION OR OWNERSHIP
IN THE PROPERTY.
As stated above in Point II, the Legislature by enacting two new sections and calling them Statutes of Limitations and also by the Preamble of the Act, intended
that such enactments should be strictly statutes of limitations and not dependent upon establishing other elements of adverse possession or ownership. To hold otherwise gives no effect to the new sections enacted and goes
back to the prior statutes which required all of the elements of adverse possession. The holding of the court
leaves a county in an impossible situation regarding the
tax titles it receives through the May sale. In order for
the four year statute to be effective there must be some of
these other elements of ownership or adverse possession
as stated by the court. In most instances a county, after
receiving title to tax property at the May sale, does not
go into possession, but the property stays as is until
some interested purchaser comes along who is interested
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in purchasing it either under contract or by paying the
full purchase price. Under the court's decision an original owner could abandon his property and not pay any
taxes thereon for an extended period of years, such as the
26 year period in the instant case. The property still
standing in the name of the county could be recovered
back by the original owner after these many years have
elapsed if there was some defect in the tax proceedings.
Under these circumstances the county could not get the
benefit of the four year statute because the county itself
had not entered into actual possession of the property and
no purchaser had come to buy the property so that the
land remained idle. Likewise the county would lose the
revenue which it might otherwise have collected if the
property had remained on the tax rolls and been assessed
against the original owner. This was the very problem
that the enactment of the four year statute of limitations
on tax title was intended to correct. To hold otherwise
places a premium on land owners not paying their taxes
and allowing them to go to the county and held and
owned by the county for any period of time until a prospective purchaser attempts to acquire the tax title and
go into possession of the property·. The original o·wner
could keep 'vatch on the property and before the four
years had run, after the purchaser from the county went
into possession, the original O\vner could file an action to
quiet his title and he \Vould not be barred by the four
yPnr statute of limitations e\Ten though the county had
held the property for 12 to 15 years as in the instant case
prior to the sale to thr nc\Y purchaser.
8
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~As

stated in the Hansen v. Morris Case, supra, this
problem was the very situation that the enactment of
these statutes of limitation sections were designed to
prevent, but with the holding of the court in the instant
case the situation is not corrected and the problem still
prevails. It \vas not the intention of the Legislature to
allow an original land owner to come in 26 years after
he had stopped paying tax on the property and the land
had gone to the county for non-payment of taxes, and be
able to assert his claim against a bona fide purchaser
from the county.
PoiNT

IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT
PLAINTIFFS HAD FAILED TO ESTABLISH
ANY VALID CLAIM OR RIGHT TO THE
PROPERTY IN THEMSELVES, AND THAT
TO HOLD FOR THE PLAINTIFFS WOULD
LEAVE THEM IN POSSESSION ALTHOUGH
THEY FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY VALID
CLAIM.
The plaintiffs do have a valid claim. They hold under
a tax title deed from San Juan County. The only reason
that this tax title deed from San Juan County does not
give good, full ownership is that in some of the prior
proceedings there was an omission to attach an affidavit to one of the assessment rolls. The plaintiffs come
into title under a written instrument and they have color
of title.
Possession is a major factor in ownership and possession alone is recognized by the law in many instances.
9
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One example is possession of a m1n1ng claim under a
Notice of Location. A party may not have a valid mining
claim because he has not as yet made a valid discovery of
ore; yet if he is in possession of the claim and attempting
to discover and find ore so that he has a valid discovery,
he has prior rights to that claim and his possession bars
others from asserting any title to the claim or attempting
to locate the area.
Another example of where possession alone can ripen
into ownership is in the case of easements. A party by
adversely using another's land for a period of 21 years
without any claim of ownership and "~ithout any payment
of taxes and without any benefits to the land owner
acquires an easement right which is the right to continue
to adversely use the land after the 21 year period. There
is, therefore, no traversity to the law to recognize a right
of possession in the tax title claimant which right of
possession would ripen into a right of ownership and a
source of title through adverse possession initiated by his
tax title purchase. Recognizing this four year statute as
strictly a. statute of limitation without the other elements
of adverse possession would leave the tax title claimant
in possession of the property, if four ~Tears had expired
from the time that the property 'Yas taken from the original owner for failure to pay the taxes. This is by reason
of the express wording of the statute, 'Yhich states that
the original owner cannot assert any title or defense after
this four yenr period.
This problem of the tax title claimant remaining in
possession has already been considered by the Court in

10
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]:Jeterson v. Callister, ~upra. The portion of that case hereinabove quoted, and particularly those portions in italics,
hold that the tax title claimant may remain in possession
of the land by reason of the four year Statute of
I~imitations.

PoiNT

V.

TIIE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETER~IINE THAT THERE HAD BEEN PAYMENT OF ALL TAXES ASSESSED AGAINST
THE PROPERTY FOR AT LEAST A FOUR
YEAR PERIOD.
This question is discussed under Point 3 of Plaintiff's first Brief filed herein, and involves a determination of whether redemption of taxes before the May sale
to the County is equivalent to the payment of taxes before
they are delinquent. The prior Utah case of Bowen v.
Olson, 2 U t. 2d 12, 268 P. 2d 983, holds that redemption is
not equivalent to payment of taxes. We respectfully
sub,
mit that in light of the new decisions in other jurisdictions
cited in our first Brief under Point 3, pages 13, 14, and 15,
the Bowen v. Olson case should be overruled and the Court
follow the rule of Virginia, California, Montana, and
other jurisdictions that redemption prior to the May sale
is equivalent to payment of the taxes before they become
delinquent after November 30th.
We respectfully submit that a rehearing should be
granted and the matter reconsidered by the court and
that the four year statute on tax title be recognized as a
11
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statute of limitation without reference to the other elements and requiremens of adverse possession as required
in the court's opinion.
Respectfully submitted,

FRANDSEN AND KELLER
By Duane A. Frandsen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
a;nd Respondents
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